Is voting in Leon County secure enough?

Analysis by Steven Mendoza

Despite proven security failures with the voting equipment used in local elections, Diebold, Inc. machines were used in the Sept. 5 primaries in Leon County and will be used again in the upcoming Nov. 7 general election.

Six years after the embarrassing presidential election in Florida, some critics claim that the state is still no closer to an efficient statewide method of voting. The punch cards and their hanging chads that caused so much turmoil in 2000 are being replaced across the state and the country by electronic voting systems. While state and federal officials applaud these machines for their ease of use and accessibility to the visually impaired, others still have lingering doubts regarding the integrity of these new systems.

On Dec. 13, 2005, Leon County Supervisor of Elections Ion Sancho performed a test on the Accu-vote OS 1.94w voting machine, and the results received widespread notice and attention. The system, manufactured by Diebold, Inc., uses an optical scanner to recognize and record votes as ballots are fed into the machine.

Harri Hursti, a Finnish computer programmer was asked to perform what is now known as the “Harri Hursti Hack,” using only a Diebold memory card Sancho provided prior to the test. The test was held at the Leon County elections warehouse where all voting machines are stored, allowing Sancho to choose the machine at random. The test was performed exactly like an election would occur.

First, Sancho printed a zero tape from the machine to verify that no votes were stored on the card before actual votes had been cast. The printout read “zero,” which showed the machine did not recognize that alterations had been made to the memory card. The fact that the alteration went undetected was the first stage of the hack.

Then, eight observers answered this question: “Can the votes on this Diebold system be hacked using the memory card?” Each observer bubbled in their response and inserted the ballot into the machine’s optical scanner. After each ballot was entered, Sancho checked the counter to make sure the machine was keeping accurate count of the votes cast. There were six “no” and two “yes” votes cast by the observers.  Once all ballots had been entered, Sancho then inserted the “ender card” to tell the machine the election had ended and printed out a total. The tape read seven “yes” votes and only one “no” vote.

Hursti did not simply flip the numbers but actually entered new values to demonstrate the possibility of fraud. Still, to prove the printer template was not simply changed, which had been proven a possibility in May of 2005, Sancho inserted the altered memory card into the central tabulator.  Unfortunately, the central tabulator still showed the altered vote count as well, proving that election results could be changed.

The memory card that was used for the hack can be purchased from Diebold’s web site for $155. The site also sells poll-worker T-shirts.

Diebold Inc. did not consent to the test, and contract negotiations between the company and Sancho came to a halt. The other two certified venders of voting machines in Florida, Election Systems and Software (ES&S) and Sequoia Voting Systems, quickly joined Diebold’s boycott of Sancho. Only after Attorney General Charlie Crist issued subpoenas to Diebold and the other two companies, did Diebold agree to meet with Sancho.

The Apr. 14 meeting resulted in the purchase of 138 machines for $691,373, the same type of machines that Hursti altered in December. Sancho, who had missed a Jan. 1 deadline that the state set to comply with the federal Help America Vote Act (HAVA), had to purchase the voting equipment to beat a May 1 deadline set for Leon County. Failure to do so could have led to punitive measures being taken against Leon County.

Sancho recently explained in a phone interview that “none of the voting machines in the U.S. are secure” and it is the case of choosing between the lesser of two evils.  He prefers the Diebold Accu-vote system because at the very least this model allows, if necessary, a hand recount of the ballots. Sancho also asserts that newly implemented “security protocols” will overcome any risk of fraud. The simplest of these measures, he says, is never allowing a person access to a voting machine without supervision.     

But what about those South Florida counties, where chaos first erupted in 2000?  Dade, Broward, and nine other counties in Florida use a system manufactured by Election Systems and Software (ES&S) called the Ivotronic. This voting system, unlike Diebold’s Accu-Vote, has no paper ballot to verify or doublecheck the machines tallies. Sancho believes Ivotronic’s software is less reliable than Diebold’s because of that inherent lack of accountability. If there was ever a question of voter fraud or election irregularities there would be nothing to discredit or confirm what the machines show.

Is the Ivotronic, a machine whose printout cannot be verified as accurate or inaccurate really the best solution for such high profile and valuable counties? It seems irresponsible for these machines to be used in any part of the United States, let alone those highly contested areas of the Florida. As Sancho points out, at least Leon County voters will be using the “lesser of two evils.”